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Zusammenfassung 
Betroffen und Beteiligt – Der Anspruch auf Partizipation aller Betroffenen in 
der transnationalen Demokratietheorie 
 
Viele Vertreter einer transnationalen Demokratie stützen ihre Forderungen 
nach globalen demokratischen Reformen auf das so genannte all-affected-
Prinzip, nach dem alle Personen, die von einer Entscheidung betroffen sind, 
auch das Recht haben, diese mitzubestimmen. Obwohl das all-affected-
Prinzip als eines der grundlegendsten Prinzipien der demokratischen Theorie 
gelten kann, ist es schwierig zu interpretieren und anzuwenden. Der erste 
Teil des vorliegenden Papiers widmet sich der Kritik am all-affected-Prinzip. 
Dabei wird argumentiert, dass schon allein die Spezifizierung, wer betroffen 
ist, eine höchst politische Frage ist, da sie notwendigerweise auf anfechtba-
ren Interessentheorien beruhen muss. Das Prinzip löst außerdem nicht das 
Problem der legitimen Konstituierung einer demokratischen Gemeinschaft, 
weil solche Vorgänge ebenfalls Entscheidungen sind, die Menschen betreffen. 
Weiterhin wird argumentiert, dass die Anwendung des Prinzips hohe Kosten 
mit sich bringt: Entweder müssen die politischen Grenzen bei jeder anste-
henden Frage neu gezogen werden, oder es muss sichergestellt werden, dass 
demokratische Politik ausschließlich im Rahmen einer abgeschlossenen 
Gemeinschaft wirkt und deren Mitglieder gleichermaßen betrifft. Im zweiten 
Teil werden zwei Versionen von transnationaler Demokratie, die beide auf 
dem all-affected-Prinzip beruhen – kosmopolitische Demokratie und delibera-
tive Demokratie – darauf untersucht, wie sie auf die formulierte Kritik ant-
worten können. Im letzten Teil wird ein alternatives Prinzip, das subject-to-
the-law-Prinzip, als möglicher Ersatz für das das all-affected-Prinzip disku-
tiert. Dem subject-to-the-law-Prinzip zufolge sollte jeder Person, die den 
Gesetzen unterliegt, das Recht zugesprochen bekommen, an deren Schaffung 
teilzunehmen. Dieses subject-to-the-law-Prinzip löst einige, aber nicht alle 
Probleme, die sich aus dem all-affected-Prinzip ergeben. 
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Abstract 
Many transnational democrats support their claims for global democratic 
reform by appealing to the so-called all-affected principle, stating that every-
one who is affected by a decision has a right to participate in making it. 
Although often identified as a core principle of democratic theory, the all-
affected principle is difficult both to interpret and to apply. In the first part of 
this paper, I examine the critique against the all-affected principle, arguing 
that specifying what it means to be affected is itself a highly political issue, 
since it must rest on some disputable theory of interests; and that the prin-
ciple does not solve the problem of how to legitimately constitute the democ-
ratic community, since such acts, too, are decisions which affect people. 
Furthermore, I argue that applying the principle comes at too high a cost: 
either political boundaries must be redrawn for each issue at stake or we 
must ensure that democratic politics only has consequences within an 
enclosed community, and that it affects its members equally. In the second 
part of the paper, I consider how two versions of transnational democratic 
theory—cosmopolitan democracy and deliberative democracy, both of which 
rely on the all-affected principle—may respond to this critique. In the final 
part of the paper, I discuss a possible replacement for the all-affected princi-
ple, an alternative principle according to which everyone who is subject to 
the laws should be granted the right to participate in making them. This 
subject-to-law principle solves some, but not all, of the problems that fol-
lowed from the all-affected principle. 
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1. Congruence Lost 
The so-called all-affected principle is supposed to give a democratic answer to 
the boundary problem in democratic theory: How can we decide the proper 
bounds of a democratic community? According to the principle, “Everyone 
who is affected by a decision of a government has a right to participate in 
that government” (Dahl 1970).1 Political theorists favouring some form of 
transnational democracy, such as cosmopolitan democracy or deliberative 
democracy,2 often invoke this principle to explain why the current, nation-
state-based boundaries of democratic governance are not normatively satisfy-
ing and why we need to democratise transnational institutions or, if you like, 
transnationalise democracy. 
David Held (2000: 18) criticises mainstream political theorists for 
merely assuming that there is symmetry or congruence between citizens and 
the decision makers they may hold to account, on the one hand, and be-
tween decision makers and the people affected by their decisions on the 
other. Globalisation has displaced this congruence, Held argues, and his 
cosmopolitan democracy project takes on the task of restoring congruence to 
political power. Held regards congruence and symmetry between input and 
output, that is, between the causes and the effects of politics, as fundamen-
tal to democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy includes, among other things, 
making the United Nations more effective and democratic, increasing region-
alisation and strengthening international courts. 
Equally concerned with the migration of problems and solutions outside 
the control of the (democratic) nation-state, some deliberative democrats, too, 
                                                   
1 Sometimes this principle (or some variant of it) is referred to as the principle of congruence, 
the principle of symmetry, or the principle of democratic inclusion (Marks 2000), the latter 
of which is somewhat of a misnomer, since the principle is just as much a criterion for 
excluding people from democratic rule. 
2 The proponents of cosmopolitan democracy and deliberative democracy at times gladly 
embrace each other as fellow transnational democrats. Sometimes deliberative democrats 
call themselves cosmopolitan democrats (Bohman 1999), and sometimes cosmopolitans 
espouse deliberative democratic ideals (Gilabert 2006). Of course the scope of everything 
lumped together under the label of deliberative democracy is much wider and deeper than 
that of cosmopolitan democratic theory, and concerns more than just democracy beyond 
the state. But cosmopolitan democrats and deliberative democrats do make partially com-
peting claims about how to achieve democracy beyond the nation-state and, as the debates 
between them demonstrate, they part company on some crucial points, for example, how 
human rights relates to democracy (Erman 2005) or how transnational governance is 
envisaged (Dryzek 1999). Thus, I think I am in good company when I treat cosmopolitan 
democracy and deliberative democracy as two kindred but distinct—sometimes rivalrous, 
sometimes unanimous—and thus comparable traditions of transnational democratic theory 
(Urbinati 2003; Verweij & Josling 2003; Cochran 2002; McGrew 2002). 
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rely on the all-affected principle as the main reason for why democracy must 
be made transnational. Indeed, some deliberative democrats suggest that 
they take the all-affected principle more seriously than do cosmopolitan 
democrats, because the former do not envisage government-like, super-
statist institutions or a global liberal democracy as the necessary end-
products. Rather, since the stakeholders change with each issue area, politi-
cal institutions must have equally changeable boundaries. Deliberative 
democracy would engage current transnational governance in discursive 
procedures, and thus proponents of deliberative democracy argue further 
that it is more feasible than cosmopolitan democracy (Verweij & Josling 
2003; Dryzek 1999; cf. McGrew 2002). 
In fact, it is hard to imagine calls for transnational democracy which are 
not animated by some version of the all-affected principle, at least in part, 
because it forges the necessary normative link, on the one hand, between 
worries over what globalisation does to democratic sovereignty and how 
increasingly autonomous and democratically unaccountable international 
institutions impact people’s lives and opportunities around the globe and, on 
the other hand, the conclusion that we must build democratic institutions of 
some sort on the international level. 
However, for as common-sensibly sound and simple the all-affected 
principle may appear, it immediately generates problems as soon as we try to 
use it to draw political boundaries. In the following, I discuss some of these 
problems. In the first part of the paper, I argue, among other things, that the 
all-affected principle does not actually give any guidance for delineating a 
political community but that it may give some absurd recommendations if we 
were to try to approximate it in a given community. In the second part, I 
discuss what transnational democrats could do in light of this critique. In the 
concluding part, I consider a principle which could be substituted for the all-
affected principle; it focuses on being subject to laws rather than being 
affected by decisions. Finally, I discuss how such a principle could amend 
transnational democratic theory. But first, let us consider some of the more 
elaborate attractions of the all-affected principle. 
*  *  *  
“Let us imagine a society … and then consider what form of government 
would be just for it”, Craig Calhoun (2003) writes to caricature how political 
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theory traditionally has avoided addressing the problems of political belong-
ing. Theorists simply assume that nation-states exist as the pre-political 
basis of politics (cf. Held 1996). Democracy means rule by the people, and 
political theorists have largely quarrelled over what this “rule” thing should 
mean, while neglecting the other half of the definition. But, as Frederick 
Whelan (1983) argues, “any democratic theory must face the logically prior 
and in some ways more fundamental question of the appropriate constitution 
of the people or unit within which democratic governance is to be practiced.” 
This is the so-called boundary problem in democratic theory: how to legiti-
mately delimit the political community relevant for democracy.3 The bound-
ary problem is not tied to any particular theory of democracy, since all theo-
ries of democracy must provide some idea about how a democracy may be 
legitimately constituted. Enter the all-affected principle, stating that anyone 
who is affected by a decision (and nobody else), has a right to participate in 
making that decision. 
There are several reasons why the all-affected principle seems morally 
appealing and plausible. In general, the all-affected principle seems to 
expound some classical democratic notions about autonomy, reciprocity, and 
consent. Aristotle, for example, distinguished the self-governing citizenry, 
“ruling and being ruled in turn”, as an element of liberty characteristic of 
good political rule among equals. Another oft-cited precursor to the all-
affected principle is the maxim of ancient Roman law: “quod omnibus tangit, 
ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet”—what concerns all, all must discuss 
and approve. Both the Aristotelian notion of the self-governing citizenry and 
the Roman dictum imply reciprocity as a principle of justice and, further, 
that liberty means living according to laws that you have given yourself. We 
find a similar concern for reciprocity in the early modern theories of the 
social contract. John Locke suggests that since men are natural equals, “no 
one can be … subjected to the political power of another, without his own 
consent” (2005 [1689]: VIII, §95), and nobody knows better than oneself what 
is in one’s own interest. Likewise, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1994 [1762]) 
grappled with the problems of legitimacy, that is, finding a political form that 
would be consented to by its participants on rational grounds. For Rousseau, 
                                                   
3 When Frederick Whelan (1983) discusses where the boundary problem arises, he mentions 
“territorial disputes involving sovereign states, or entities aspiring to statehood”, but not 
the context that seems the most obvious today, namely, the challenge that globalisation 
poses to democracy. 
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government is legitimate in so far as it reflects the general will of the political 
organism formed through the social contract—a will that every citizen is thus 
justly subjected to. Admittedly, neither Aristotle’s “autonomy” nor Locke’s 
“consent of the governed” nor Rousseau’s “general will” imply the all-affected 
principle, but this principle does seem to rhyme and resonate with their 
ideas, that is, to spell out in clear terms an abstract ideal common to all of 
these philosophers. 
Furthermore, the all-affected principle implies a defensive view of poli-
tics, where political decisions and institutions inflict costs and burdens, if 
not damage, on people, as Whelan suggests. Fear of the Leviathan has been a 
strong argument for democracy: people have a right to participate in politics 
so as not to have their interests superseded by those who hold the monopoly 
on the use of force. The all-affected principle seems to support our politics-
sceptical hunch to be sceptical of politics; moreover, historically, it has been 
employed to support extending the franchise to groups previously excluded 
from participating in democratic politics. Transnational democrats often 
reason in a similar way: People affected—for instance, by global warming, 
trade policies, acid rain, financial deregulation and other transnational 
issues—form the constituency of world politics (Saward 2000a; cf. Zürn 
2004). 
Finally, the all-affected principle may also appeal to us because it 
resembles the usual solution to the question of scope in utilitarian theory. 
Most utilitarians agree that utilitarianism requires that we advance the 
welfare of humanity as a whole (Singer 2004). However, many utilitarians 
have argued that dividing the world into “separate jurisdictions, with a rule 
in favour of giving preference to co-nationals can be justified in terms of the 
greatest happiness principle” (Brown 2000: 196), but the value of states is 
then always merely instrumental, as the possibly most efficient way to 
maximise the good of all sentient beings everywhere (Ellis 1992). The all-
affected principle, Whelan suggests, may even be derived as a political 
application of such a utilitarian stance, so perhaps the all-affected principle 
could tap utilitarianism for moral support. 
2. Problems with the All-Affected Principle 
In the following section, I shall examine four critical arguments against the 
all-affected principle. Mostly, the arguments concern whether the all-affected 
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principle is possible to apply at all, whether it gives any practical guidance 
for democratic institutions and, if so, whether the guidance it gives is desir-
able. First, I shall argue that the all-affected principle is problematic as a 
criterion for delimiting political community, since it must rest on some theory 
of interests, a deeply political issue in its own right. I shall also discuss 
Whelan’s claim that the all-affected principle leads to an infinite regress of 
constitutive decisions, which complicates the matter further. Thereafter, I 
shall discuss two ways of approximating the principle, either by drawing 
political boundaries around the affected or by keeping consequences within 
existing bounds. I think that these arguments, taken together, provide strong 
reasons to reject the all-affected principle, its intuitive appeal notwithstand-
ing. 
2.1 How Do We Recognise Affectedness When We See It? 
If we wish to apply the all-affected principle, we must first clarify what we 
mean by “affectedness”. What does it mean to be affected by a political deci-
sion? Obviously, the all-affected principle by itself does not explain what 
“being affected” means, so we have to complement the principle with some 
theory about affectedness. An objective approach to affectedness would 
require that we be able to specify, measure and assess the burdens and 
benefits inflicted upon individuals by political institutions, policies and 
decisions. 
In the most general sense, being affected by political decisions and 
institutions implies that some of your basic rights or interests have been 
infringed upon (cf. Arrhenius 2005). Although they rarely specify what being 
“relevantly affected” means, the advocates of the all-affected principle usually 
employ environmental problems as the paradigm for situations in which the 
principle applies. Global warming, toxic waste disposal, acid rain, radioactive 
fallout—these are the kind of contemporary cross-border problems that may 
affect people other than those who caused them. You are affected, then, 
when something bad happens to you through no fault of your own. David 
Held could probably express such bad things in terms of “nautonomy”, that 
is, as being deprived of your physical, social, economical, political, or cultural 
autonomy. But we could also adopt, say, Robert Nozick’s (2001) libertarian 
theory of self-ownership as the relevant theory of affectedness. 
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Now, depending on which theory of affectedness we choose, we will 
arrive at different or even diametrically opposed judgements. Nozick would 
say that forced redistribution of incomes violates people’s basic rights and 
interests, whereas safeguarding the sort of social autonomy Held has in mind 
would require an extensive welfare state financed through taxation. And 
different people will count as affected by the same decision depending on 
which theory of affectedness we choose. Someone is unrightfully affected on 
the Nozickian account if he or she is forced to pay taxes for redistribution, 
but on the Heldian account if he or she is not guaranteed a basic level of 
subsistence. So which theory of affectedness should we pick? I think that 
there is no point in trying to argue that one of these theories of affectedness 
is objectively true or, even if it were, that we could know this. These are the 
kinds of clashes of interests and values that democratic politics is supposed 
to be able to sort out in a peaceful manner. People will disagree about what it 
means to be relevantly affected, just as they disagree on other fundamental 
matters of principle (cf. Waldron 2001).  
The all-affected principle is usually understood to concern burdens, but 
not benefits. And, at first glance, to take benefits into account does seem to 
be problematic. Would a decision be undemocratic if you prosper from it 
without having had an opportunity to participate in making it? To take an 
environmental example of the kind that transnational democrats like to 
invoke and adjust the all-affected principle accordingly, to account for bene-
fits, it would seem peculiar to argue that an upstream community which has, 
for instance, unilaterally cleaned up a polluted river has made an illegitimate 
decision solely because the decision-making process excluded beneficiaries 
downstream. We could then qualify the all-affected principle by stating that 
only negative externalities, so to speak, may be illegitimate, not the positive 
ones.4 
But real-life political issues are usually more complex than cleaning up 
a fictitious river.5 Political decisions produce both burdens and benefits and 
                                                   
4 In a similar vein, James Bohman suggests that in the case of national governments, “we 
would surely say that a democracy is illegitimate if its worst-off citizens are required to 
obey laws and decisions over which they had no effective influence”. That is, a political 
process is illegitimate only when it excludes people who are negatively affected, not when it 
excludes people who avail from its decisions (Bohman 1999). 
5 Arrhenius suggests as an example of how the all-affected principle would draw its bounda-
ries that whereas the school curriculum in Waco, Texas, is not a matter of concern for Ice-
landers, the Texan teachers’ hairspray is, in so far as the aerosol propellants deplete the 
atmospheric ozone layer. Again, real-life cases are rarely that clear-cut, and we can at least 
imagine that the Icelanders would care more about what is being taught in Texan schools 
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distribute them unequally. Furthermore, once we start conceiving of political 
consequences in economic, utilitarian terms, it seems logical to think of 
benefits and burdens as commensurable. A burden translates into a negative 
benefit and vice versa—that is, being deprived of a benefit is a burden and 
alleviating a burden equals a benefit. Whereas it would be difficult to keep 
separate balance sheets for benefits and burdens respectively, if we do take 
them both into account the all-affected principle, in turn, becomes very 
difficult (if not impossible) to apply. 
Finally, how should we aggregate and weight burdens and benefits? 
Torbjörn Tännsjö argues that if we regard democracy as a method of aggre-
gating interests, it would be more reasonable to interpret the all-affected 
principle as a claim that everyone should have an influence proportional to 
the stakes he or she holds. A graded right to participate certainly seems to fit 
the rationale behind the all-affected principle, since only then would an 
intensely affected minority be able to trump a slightly affected majority. On 
the other hand, grading people’s right to participate in decision-making 
according to the extent to which they are apparently affected would seem to 
be at odds with the basic democratic principle of one person, one vote.6 In 
effect, it grants a veto to minorities with strong preferences. I think few 
proponents of the all-affected principle would depart from this basic democ-
ratic principle of equality as happily as Tännsjö does.7 
To sum up, then, in addition to the logical and procedural problems of 
constituting the relevant political communities, the all-affected principle 
appears to be difficult to specify, because what it means to be affected by 
politics is itself a highly political question. I believe the search for objective 
criteria for specifying the all-affected principle is a mistaken approach, 
because the principle must be founded on some particular notion of what it 
means to be affected and such notions are frequently matters of fundamental 
disagreement. 
                                                                                                                                                  
than about what their teachers use to coif their hair. Consider, as well, the concern that 
the French policy to ban headscarves and kippas in public schools raised among religious 
groups in other countries; or the outrage in many Western countries over Saudi school 
curricula and textbooks teaching children to abhor religions other than Wahhabite Islam. 
Are those concerned in these cases relevantly affected? Have their interests been infringed 
upon? They certainly seem to think so. 
6 And besides, we may again ask, by what standard or conception of affectedness should 
people’s right to participate be graded? By Held’s or by Nozick’s? 
7 But indeed, the all-affected principle does seem difficult to reconcile with majority rule. 
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So perhaps we should instead look for subjective criteria for affected-
ness. Michael Saward (2000a) endorses both the all-affected principle and a 
“‘subjective’ way of locating issue-based subject populations”. He suggests 
cross-border initiatives, by which a significant number of citizens can raise 
border-transgressing issues for referenda, and argues that innovations like 
these would actually better match the rationale behind the all-affected prin-
ciple than Held’s scheme for cosmopolitan reform. 
A subjective understanding of affectedness could, I believe, draw sup-
port from a different tradition in democratic theory. In Noortje Marres (2005) 
constructive reading of the debate between Walter Lippmann and John 
Dewey, the affected come to play a different role from the one which they 
have according to conventional transnational democratic theory. Despite 
their differences, Lippmann and Dewey both addressed not the subjects of 
politics, but its objects. Whereas democratic theory traditionally focuses on 
the persons whom democracy enables to master their own fate, Lippmann 
and Dewey were more concerned with the issues of politics. In the complex, 
technological societies in which we live, the intricate objects of politics seem 
to constitute an obstacle to democracy. How are citizens supposed to govern 
themselves, when the issues that they have to deal with are so complex and 
extraordinary?  
It now would seem to be a simple matter to solve the problem that com-
plex objects pose to democracy by either providing citizens with better and 
more up-to-date information or by simplifying difficult issues so that citizens 
can grasp them. Dewey, however, contended that “foreign entanglements” 
and complex issues, far from constituting an obstacle to democratic politics, 
actually play a central role in getting people involved in politics. Strange, 
unfamiliar and complex issues are an enabling condition for democracy, and 
precisely because issues are difficult to resolve, we need to bring them out in 
public view. 
Publics get involved in politics precisely where existing institutions fail 
to deliver. Dewey suggests that the public does not just spring up from 
nowhere. It consists of people who are affected by human actions on which 
they have no direct influence. People who believe that they have been affected 
by some such issue or policy must organise themselves into a visible com-
munity—a public. On Dewey’s account, then, affectedness is subjective, and 
more an enabling condition for democratic politics and participation than a 
rigid, objective criterion for drawing boundaries. Furthermore, as soon as a 
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group of affected persons form a public and thus becomes involved in poli-
tics, that group also begins to affect others.8 
On Roland Axtmann’s (2006) equally interesting reading of Hannah 
Arendt as a theorist of democracy in a globalised world, Arendt similarly 
embraces the idea that politics is a matter of the concerned.9 In Arendt’s 
ideal republic, the elite is not chosen but constitutes itself, like the publics 
sparked into being by issues. However, one could object, such a republic 
would be an aristocratic form of government, “where only those who have a 
demonstrated concern about the state of the world would have a right to be 
heard in the conduct of the business of the republic”. On the other hand, just 
as we may choose to be concerned, we may choose not to be, which actually 
is a good thing: Such “self-exclusion, far from being arbitrary discrimination, 
would in fact give substance and reality to one of the most important 
negative liberties …freedom from politics” (Arendt cited in Axtmann 2006) 
There is something appealing about these subjective conceptions of af-
fectedness, because they seem to fit with a political (as distinct from apoliti-
cal) view of democracy. But if we opt for this subjective notion of affected-
ness, then we cannot use the all-affected principle to draw objective norma-
tively justified boundaries around political communities, because there is 
obviously nothing inherently justified in anyone’s claim to be affected and 
therefore included (cf. Freeman 2000: 375). 
2.2 The All-Affected Principle Does Not Solve the Boundary 
Problem 
However, the most serious objection to the all-affected principle is that it 
actually does not solve the boundary problem, because the principle creates 
an unsolvable hen-and-egg paradox. Since every political decision presup-
poses a prior decision on whom to include—a decision that affects some 
people—the principle leads to a logical as well as procedural impossibility, as 
Frederick Whelan demonstrates:  
                                                   
8 Similarly, Nadia Urbinati argues that the actors of global governance “are united as a result 
of the problem(s) they are affected by and that they aim at solving. Interest groups, not the 
‘citizens of the world’, are their multiple agencies” (Urbinati 2003). In other words, subjec-
tive, interest-based affectedness calls upon actors to engage in politics.  
9 Arendt’s starting point for theorising on democracy is also similar to Marres, taking an 
interdependent, interrelated world—globalisation, we would say today—as the fact from 
which modern political theory starts, rather than first assuming an isolated community 
and only then adding the complicating circumstance of a surrounding world. 
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Before a democratic decision could be made on a particular issue (by those 
affected) a prior decision would have to be made, in each case, as to who is 
affected and therefore entitled to vote on the subject—a decision, that is, on the 
proper bounds of the relevant constituency. And how is this decision, which 
will be determinative for the ensuing substantive decision, to be made? It too 
should presumably be made democratically—that is, by those affected (Whelan 
1983: 19). 
Thus, once we try to delineate the political community by means of the all-
affected principle, we enter a logical loop, an infinite regress of constitutive 
decisions from which the all-affected principle offers no escape. Delimiting 
the political community is a political decision which affects people, too, 
probably even more than any decision that might follow once the community 
has formed itself. 
Moreover, once we try to apply the all-affected principle to substantive 
policy, its indeterminacy is obvious. In most cases, who is affected depends 
on what substantive decision the political community makes; and the prob-
lem is not just theoretical. For example, a protectionist trade policy benefits 
and harms different people than does a free trade regime. So whom should 
we include in deciding which trade policy to adopt? Likewise, progressive 
taxation will affect different people differently than a flat tax, so who is to be 
included in deciding taxation policy? The point is that, depending on whom 
we include in the decision-making process, we will reach different policies 
and, depending on what substantive policies we choose, we will affect differ-
ent people who would have to be included in the first place. 
Whelan’s argument demonstrates why the all-affected principle actually 
gives no guidance either in matters of how to delineate the community or of 
what policies to pursue. The proponents of the principle seem to recognise 
these problems. Torbjörn Tännsjö suggests that we could get out of the 
logical loop by selecting a constitutional assembly of “founding mothers and 
fathers” to solve the boundary problem. But this solution not only disregards 
the fact that the boundary problem arises recurrently on every issue, if we 
take the all-affected principle seriously; the solution also effectively excludes 
most of the people who are affected by the constituting decision from the act 
of constituting it. In a similar vein, David Held (1995: 237) suggested that 
“issue-boundary forums or courts will have to be created to hear cases 
concerning where and how ‘significant interest’ in a public question should 
be explored and resolved”. That is, these new institutions would be given the 
authority to decide when, where and how the all-affected principle applies, 
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including picking a theory of affectedness. As Michael Saward (2000a) notes, 
Held’s proposal would vest enormous powers “in unelected authorities 
requiring inhuman levels of knowledge and wisdom”. 
Furthermore, both Tännsjö’s and Held’s solution presuppose that there 
is a correct and objective answer to be reached—that these institutions, with 
which we entrust the power to solve boundary problems, can decide in a 
neutral way who has been affected and thus has a legitimate claim to be 
included. As the examples indicated above demonstrate, who is affected 
cannot be settled independently of the substantive decision. By giving inde-
pendent institutions the power to decide who is affected, we also grant them 
the power to decide on substantive matters as well. Depending on how these 
institutions draw the boundaries, different policies will result.10 
2.3 The All-Affected Principle Leads to Fickle Boundaries 
Whether we think of affectedness as objective or subjective, the all-affected 
principle seems to imply that we ought to redraw political boundaries for 
each decision that is to be made or, at any rate, that each issue requires its 
own functional constituency. That is, boundaries would be considerably 
volatile if constantly redrawn so as to meet the requirements of the all-
affected principle. Some suggest that this requirement represents a major 
problem with the principle, whereas others see the resulting volatility of 
boundaries as an advantage. 
However, the advocates of the principle seem to disagree on how far the 
idea of issue-based constituencies actually leads us. The most radical inter-
pretation holds that for every single political decision to be made, we have to 
first decide the relevant political community, that is, who is affected and thus 
ought to be included. Some deliberative democrats who perceive themselves 
as radicals nod in this direction and embrace the fluid boundaries following 
from the all-affected principle. John Dryzek (1996), for example, argues that 
deliberative democracy “can cope with fluid boundaries, and the production 
of outcomes across boundaries”, and this is in fact what makes deliberative 
democracy such a suitable theory of transnational democracy. David Held, by 
contrast, seems to think of redrawing boundaries by means of the all-affected 
principle as more of a one-off process whereby we shift authority to new but 
                                                   
10 The practice of gerrymandering demonstrates that this is not just a hypothetical concern. 
Drawing the boundaries of political communities are essentially political issues of power.  
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permanent territorial layers of government, with regional and global demo-
cratic institutions added to those already existing at national and local 
levels.11 
Some critics argue that because the all-affected principle leads to politi-
cal boundaries that are unstable and issue-area specific, it is not a very 
practical criterion of legitimacy for political institutions (Whelan 1983: 19; 
Dahl 1970: 64). Political boundaries could change from day to day and it 
would be hard to consolidate political institutions. Even if we shift the tasks 
that states perform to new regional, global or issue-specific institutions, such 
tasks nevertheless require a degree of continuity, especially if they are to be 
done in a way that is democratically accountable to anyone who is affected 
by them. However, one could argue that as long as the consequences of 
political decisions are fairly permanent and uniform, the boundaries drawn 
by the all-affected principle would be accordingly stable. Moreover, there is a 
solid body of literature on international institutions, which argues that 
international problem-solving is already organised into specific issue areas 
that are all but ephemeral (cf. Coleman & Porter 2000).12 
Thus, in spite of these practical problems, I think we should worry more 
about what happens to the conditions for democratic participation once we 
redraw political boundaries according to the all-affected principle. Dynamic, 
issue-specific political boundaries could well be feasible, but are they also 
desirable? Whether we understand the resulting political institutions to be 
overlapping, issue-specific institutions or layered territorial entities with 
broader responsibilities, the communities corresponding to them are sup-
posed to replace the once so self-evident categories that nation-states sorted 
people into. Just as the territorial nation-state will be replaced by an array of 
institutions claiming authority, so the sole citizenship of the individual will 
be replaced with a variety of affiliations with different communities of fate, 
choice and chance (Held 1999). But what happens then to the rights, duties 
and belonging that territorial states, for better or for worse, have granted 
                                                   
11 Although Held sometimes talks about cosmopolitan democratic reform as a project of 
building new political institutions around his “seven sites of power”, the concrete proposals 
for international reform that he puts forward seem more based in a layered territorial state 
logic (cf. Saward 2000a; Dryzek 1999; Coleman & Porter 2000). 
12 In fact, a plausible fall-back position for transnational democrats would be to argue that, 
albeit far from perfect, the nation-state has provided a practical shortcut for application of 
the all-affected principle; in our globalised world, international regimes could offer an im-
perfect but decent approximation where improved democratic participation could allow for 
a better overlap between decisions and their consequences. 
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their citizens? Michael Saward argues that the protection of democratic 
rights depends upon secure and equal membership in a given unit. Applying 
the all-affected principle thus risks taking away the very foundation of demo-
cratic rights without replacing it with something better: 
if the constituency can and must change for each decision, then the rights of 
“members” are not fixed, or immutable, from one decision to the next … 
Membership is only secure, because the grounds of citizenship and rightful 
political participation can only be clear, in a territorial entity (Saward 2000a: 
38). 
Nor would the rights of community members be equal, if people only had a 
right to participate in political decision making corresponding to the stakes 
they hold. Thus, even if the overlapping, multilevel institutions and constitu-
encies were to be stable and fixed rather than ephemeral, the rights of par-
ticipation accorded to citizens would be tenuous (cf. Chandler 2003). 
But must the all-affected principle really lead to fluid, issue-specific 
political boundaries? A different way to abide by the all-affected principle 
would be to ensure that a given territorial political community, national or 
transnational, produces outcomes that are in accordance with it. Instead of 
reshaping the boundaries of political institutions to fit with their conse-
quences, we could try to reshape the political consequences to fit with exist-
ing boundaries. We would then try to assure that only those persons are 
affected who are already included in political decision making. Both solutions 
seem to meet the all-affected principle’s requirements. Therefore, if such 
territorial communities still wish to abide by the all-affected principle, what 
policies would they have to pursue? I shall now address this latter solution to 
fulfilling the all-affected principle. 
2.4 The All-Affected Principle Leads to Unpalatable Policy 
Recommendations 
Thus far I have argued that the all-affected principle does not offer any clear 
guidance on whom to include in a democratic political community, nor does 
it help us decide on substantive policies. But as vague as the principle may 
appear, there may be other recommendations that can be derived from it. I 
shall discuss those further implications of the principle, and I shall argue 
that they suggest further reasons not to make democratic theory dependent 
on the all-affected principle. 
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Hans Agné presents an interesting argument against the all-affected 
principle by trying to explicate the conditions for fulfilling it in a world of 
states. The all-affected principle has two components: to participate in mak-
ing a decision and to be affected by that decision. For the sake of simplicity, 
if we interpret the components as dichotomous (as do most of the all-affected 
principle’s supporters), there are two ways in which the all-affected principle 
could be violated: If someone who is affected by a decision is excluded from 
taking part in it or, conversely, if someone who is not affected participates in 
making a decision. Such illegitimate exclusion and illegitimate inclusion are 
equally ruled out by the all-affected principle. Obviously, the all-affected 
principle is equally satisfied if you participate in making a decision that 
affects you or if you do not participate in making a decision that does not 
affect you. 
Interpreted in the dichotomous way, the all-affected principle puts 
seemingly drastic requirements on democratic decision making. Even in the 
kind of solitary confinement within which democratic theory normally puts 
the state, it seems difficult to rule out completely the possibility that some-
one participates in making decisions without being affected by them or vice 
versa. Once we add the complicating assumption of a world of states, it 
becomes virtually impossible to avoid illegitimate exclusion and thus to avoid 
violating the all-affected principle. Even if a community interacts minimally 
with the surrounding world, some decisions that that community makes will 
affect some persons outside its borders who are not allowed to participate in 
making those decisions. 
In effect, globalisation may also lead to illegitimate inclusion. Agné’s 
argument runs roughly like this: A community may avoid illegitimate 
inclusion when collective decisions concern properties that all its members 
share. For example, if everyone is at least a potential taxpayer and a 
potential benefactor of public expenditures, then we may safely include 
everyone in deciding on tax policy. The more characteristics people share, the 
more evenly will they be affected by the decisions that they make. Thus, to 
avoid illegitimate inclusion, a democratic community must seek to make its 
members more uniform—economically, socially, culturally and by any other 
relevant dimension—so that nobody who participates in collective decision 
making can shield him- or herself from the consequences.13 In order to make 
                                                   
13 The same problem occurs if we interpret affectedness not as dichotomous but as a graded 
quality (you may be more or less affected by a collective decision). To the extent that some 
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the population more homogenous and less fragmented and stratified, it may 
be reasonable to try to isolate the community from influx from outside. Thus, 
the set of processes we call globalisation may lead to illegitimate inclusion, 
because globalisation brings heterogeneity into a previously well-integrated 
collective. It will be difficult to fulfil the all-affected principle if people are not 
considerably similar and equal, Agné concludes.14 Because the all-affected 
principle suggests that democracy can only be achieved in an isolated and 
homogenous political community, Agné rules the principle out as an element 
of nationalist ideology: “[O]nly a nation-state, firmly founded on a mythology 
of unity and autonomy, can wield the social powers required by the [all-
affected principle].” 
So, a community that takes the all-affected principle seriously would 
have to pursue a policy of isolation and homogenisation. Agné’s conclusion 
may seem stretched. Would the proponents of the all-affected principle really 
agree that it implies a nationalist, isolationist policy? Probably not. After all, 
most of them use the all-affected principle to support claims for transna-
tional democracy—not for nationalist and isolationist policies. Agné assumes 
that the political community attempting to approximate the all-affected 
principle is a state, but this is the very assumption challenged by transna-
tional democrats. 
Nevertheless, the implications that Agné spells out from the all-affected 
principle are not significantly different from the standard narrative framing 
transnational democracy. Since globalisation has displaced and disturbed 
the once so neat match between political authority and cultural, economic 
and social borders—so transnational democrats claim—we need to build new 
democratic institutions beyond or above the state as well. In so doing we may 
regain lost symmetry or congruence—a congruence which before it was lost 
always required a high degree of homogenisation, unity and cohesion. If we 
                                                                                                                                                  
people who participate in a decision are less affected than others, the former are included 
illegitimately. How can we avoid such illegitimate inclusion? Again, the all-affected principle 
seems to require that all people share the characteristic or property with which the deci-
sion is concerned. All must live under similar economic conditions for economic policy to 
affect them equally; all must live under similar social conditions for social policy to affect 
them equally, and so on. 
14 When Agné argues that heterogeneity in a political community poses a threat to realising 
the all-affected principle, his reasoning bears a striking resemblance (though an opposite 
conclusion) with Carl Schmitt’s dismissal of liberal democracy. Schmitt, who defined de-
mocracy as an identity between the rulers and the ruled, argued that fascism and commu-
nism were democratic in so far as they achieved this identity of governing and governed. By 
contrast, liberalism (and globalisation, we could add today) leads to pluralism, Schmitt 
argued, which inevitably undermines the identity between rulers and ruled, and so liberal-
ism would not be compatible with democracy (Torfing 1999: 253). 
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were to fulfil the all-affected principle at the transnational political level, it 
might well have similar policy implications to those which emerged at the 
state level. For example, identity politics in the European Union seem to 
reproduce nationalist ideology at the European level, albeit under a flag of 
post-nationalism (Hellström 2006). 
In that sense, by means of the all-affected principle, transnational de-
mocrats seem to bring on board more of the notion of the nation-state as the 
locus of politics than they would like to think themselves. They premise 
democracy on a conception of symmetry or congruence between political and 
social boundaries which we have now lost. As it were, the all-affected princi-
ple renders transnational democrats just as rooted as other political theorists 
in a tradition regarding the political entity to which democracy applies as a 
closed circuit, a conception so appositely described by Walter Lippmann:  
The democratic tradition is … always trying to see a world where people are 
exclusively concerned with affairs of which the causes and effects all operate 
within the region they inhabit. … And although democrats recognise that they 
are in contact with external affairs, they see quite surely that every contact 
outside the self-contained group is a threat to democracy as originally 
conceived (Lippmann, cited in Marres 2005). 
2.5 Reading the Principle Not Quite So Literally 
So far I have argued that the all-affected principle is indeterminable, virtually 
impossible to apply and leads to some peculiar guidelines for democratic 
communities who take it seriously. But should we actually take it that seri-
ously, in the sense of reading it as a literal rule by which democratic politics 
must abide? After all, most normative principles are vague and ambiguous 
and could lead to absurd conclusions if we were to try to follow them too 
rigidly and categorically. So perhaps we should not let the absurd implica-
tions that may arise in some concrete situations lead us to abandon a princi-
ple that may be sound in a more abstract sense. 
Gustaf Arrhenius (2005) defends the all-affected principle against such 
easy confutation. Although the all-affected principle may be both impractical 
and unfeasible as a method of democratic decision making in real situations, 
it may still well be part of the normative ideal of democracy, Arrhenius sug-
gests. We may cherish the principle as an end, although not as a means to 
that end. That’s how rule utilitarians reason when they admit that attempt-
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ing to maximise utility in each and every action we take may lead to absurd 
consequences, but nevertheless argue that we should seek personal rules of 
thumb and political institutions that lead to the greatest possible utility. In a 
similar sense, the all-affected principle may sometimes lead to absurdities if 
applied in particular circumstances, but nevertheless provides a standard by 
which we may measure the democratic inclusiveness of practically feasible 
methods of decision making. And even though none of these methods will 
ever fulfil the principle’s demands, Arrhenius concludes, the all-affected 
principle may nonetheless help us discriminate among better and worse 
decision making procedures. 
Given that the all-affected principle is difficult to apply to concrete 
situations, it seems reasonable to consider the all-affected principle not as a 
razor-sharp rule, but rather as a desirable yet not fully attainable and some-
what nebulous ideal of democratic theory. However, this is not how the 
advocates of the principle in transnational democratic theory really view it at 
all. They, and indeed Arrhenius himself, apply it to concrete situations of 
drawing political boundaries—for instance, whether it is permissible to build 
nuclear power plants or perform atmospheric nuclear weapon tests near the 
border of another state—and not just to abstract questions of institutional 
design. It is difficult to determine what the all-affected principle implies as an 
abstract ideal rather than a concrete rule. 
However, if we could distinguish decisions from ideals, this latter way of 
viewing the all-affected principle would allow us to escape Whelan’s logical 
loop. Arrhenius suggests that instead of entering the infinite regress of 
constitutive decisions, we should simply concoct a theory of interests and 
analyse how different decisions, policies and institutions would affect 
people’s interests, and then decide who is to be included.15 (After that, 
presumably, the community can go back to democratic business as usual.) 
But who is this “we” who are supposed to decide on these important matters? 
Who should decide what affectedness means and analyse the consequences 
of different political choices? These too are political decisions and taking the 
all-affected principle seriously, if not literally, such decisions should 
reasonably be made by anyone who is affected. Hence, we are drawn back to 
the infinite regress which Arrhenius has failed to bring to a convincing end. 
                                                   
15 This is the task that Held and Tännsjö wish to delegate to non-majoritarian institutions; 
Arrhenius seems to nod in the same direction and likewise supposes that we could find 
objective criteria for affectedness. 
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3. Transnational Democracy Beyond the All-Affected Principle 
Thus far I have argued that the all-affected principle does not hold, for a 
number of reasons. Since both cosmopolitan democrats and deliberative 
democrats crucially rely on it, let us now consider how they would be affected 
by the critique I have suggested here. 
3.1 Cosmopolitans Without a Cause 
The all-affected principle seems to parallel a general, cosmopolitan universal-
ism, namely, that we are all connected to one another on this globe and that 
no one can remain indifferent and unmoved by the suffering of others, re-
gardless of where or when this may occur (Kleingeld & Brown 2002). Cosmo-
politan democrats wish to turn this general universalism into a political 
cause by wedding it to democracy; the all-affected principle is just one of 
their means for doing so. Daniele Archibugi (2003) suggests that there is 
something wrong with democratic theory if, for example, it allows the French 
to decide in a perfectly democratic manner to perform nuclear tests in the 
Pacific, without ever having to consult the people who live there. And Susan 
Marks claims that the all-affected principle is the main message distinguish-
ing cosmopolitan democracy from other notions of transnational democracy: 
In place of the idea that the nation-state is democracy’s container, [cosmopoli-
tan democracy] seeks to entrench the idea that democracy is relevant wherever 
and whenever an action is taken which affects the capacity of individuals and 
groups to determine the conditions of their collective lives (Marks 2000: 104). 
If we strip the cosmopolitan democrats’ argument down to a basic practical 
syllogism, the all-affected principle is the crucial normative premise underly-
ing that argument. The all-affected principle allows them to draw the conclu-
sion that globalisation implies that we must take democracy to a transna-
tional level. Given, then, how much prestige cosmopolitan democrats vest in 
the all-affected principle, the critique that I have suggested here must seem 
discouraging. Once we discard the all-affected principle, there is nothing to 
glue the practical conclusion to the factual diagnosis of the state of the 
world.  
So how could cosmopolitan democrats respond to this critique? One 
way to rehabilitate the all-affected principle would be to say that in a global 
democracy some of the problems discussed here may disappear. Whelan’s 
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infinite regress of constitutive decisions may have an end where everyone is 
included (cf. Arrhenius 2005; Näsström 2003). Furthermore, there would be 
no need for the isolationist policy that Agné deduced from the all-affected 
principle, since there would be no outside from which to fear a negative 
influx that could stratify the population. On the other hand, the all-affected 
principle may well suggest a policy for levelling differences among people so 
that they would all be more likely to be equally affected by collective deci-
sions. Held’s “democratic public law” is a far-reaching attempt to provide 
people all over the world with more equal living conditions—economic, social, 
cultural, political, and so on—and it would seem to be a proximate pro-
gramme for realising this aspect of the all-affected principle on a global scale. 
But not even cosmopolitan democrats believe that Held’s notion is realistic or 
that it represents a feasible, let alone desirable, plan to create a single global 
democratic system, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, the all-affected principle could just as well (or just as 
poorly) support a conclusion opposite to cosmopolitan democracy. Whereas 
cosmopolitan democrats argue that because politics has become global, 
democracy must become global too; we could argue inversely that because 
democracy (as we know it) is national, the impacts of politics must remain 
under or be returned to national control too, that is, we must renationalise 
the authority accorded to supranational institutions beyond our democratic 
reach (cf. Zürn 2004). In fact, some green theorists invoke the all-affected 
principle to suggest that politics must be scaled down, even from the national 
level, in order to achieve the symmetry between causes and effects required 
by the all-affected principle (Hines 2000; cf. Barry 1999). The all-affected 
principle in itself has no preference for levels. 
So the kind of cosmopolitan causes addressed by Archibugi and Marks 
may not at all be supported by the all-affected principle. In a broader sense, 
the problems of specifying the boundaries of democracy reveal the limits of 
democratic theory. Democractic theory goes a long way, but it is not a con-
summate moral or political theory, that is, the only one we would need in 
order to determine how we ought to order life in any kind of society. In fact, it 
would be a sorry state of affairs if democracy were the only argument we 
could invoke when facing difficult issues like nuclear weapons testing on 
faraway atolls. But once we invoke the all-affected principle on these issues 
as a matter of democracy, in order to express our moral indignation, and 
argue that these actions are wrong (not primarily because of their conse-
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quences but because the people suffering those consequences have had no 
say in the decision-making process), then we have also effectively weakened 
our moral claims because the all-affected principle cannot by itself lead to 
particularly strong condemnation of anything. 
3.2 Being Affected without Affect 
Many proponents of deliberative democracy suggest that their account of 
democracy is especially well suited for a globalised, internationalised world, 
precisely because they elevate the all-affected principle to a central demo-
cratic principle. Theirs is “a democracy of the affected” (Eckersley 2000). Who 
should be a member of the relevant deliberative community depends on what 
particular stakeholders are affected by the exercise of public power on the 
issue at stake. Thus, deliberative democrats may fully recognise that abiding 
by the all-affected principle leads to the practical problem of redrawing the 
boundaries of the political community for every issue at stake, and yet main-
tain that this is precisely what a deliberative process always ought to look 
like. John Dryzek (2000) argues that “deliberation … can cope with fluid 
boundaries, and the production of outcomes across boundaries”. Just like 
the issues, boundaries are the product of the deliberative process: 
The process of deliberation itself becomes constitutive of the relevant delib-
erative community. This reflexivity, argue its advocates, makes deliberative 
democracy admirably suitable to a world in which there are overlapping 
communities of fate and in which the organization and exercise of power no 
longer coincide with the bounded territorial political community (McGrew 
2002). 
Deliberative democrats thus have a functional conception of the demos. 
Radical deliberative democrats here seem to believe that they can escape the 
boundary problem because they never presupposed a static demos or nation-
state to begin with. But who is then to be included in the deliberative and 
decision-making process? Everyone affected, many deliberative democrats 
say, citing the all-affected principle; but, as we now know, this is not much of 
an answer (cf. Saward 2000b). 
Actually, deliberative democratic theory and the all-affected principle 
make strange bedfellows. As we have seen so far, the all-affected principle 
seems to be most reasonably interpreted as an application of utilitarianism to 
democratic theory or, at any rate, as regarding democracy as a procedure for 
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interest aggregation. Deliberative democrats, however, usually take a strong 
stance against this understanding of democracy and define themselves in 
opposition to what they term as aggregative liberal democracy. So, how do 
they make ends meet? 
Deliberative democracy is not just supposed to be a procedure for delib-
erating over issues and making collective decisions: it is also supposed to 
help us arrive at better and truer decisions, that is, it ought to have epis-
temic value (Warren 2002; Bohman 1998; Chambers 2003). As Habermas 
(2001) puts it, on a discourse-theoretical account, 
the democratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, indeed not 
even predominantly, from political participation and the expression of political 
will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process whose 
structure grounds an expectation of rationally acceptable results (p. 110). 
That is, deliberative democracy is justified when it is organised so as to 
provide us with the best answers. 
But the all-affected principle as a criterion for inclusion seems to con-
flict with the epistemic conception of deliberative democracy (cf. Arrhenius 
2005). If we cherish democratic deliberation because it helps us to arrive at 
the truth, why should affectedness be the main criterion for selecting the 
deliberators instead of, say, competence or expert knowledge? Just because 
someone is affected does not mean that he or she is more likely to arrive at 
truer or better answers or to deliberate in a more honestly truth-seeking 
manner. Habermas would probably reply that, in order to discover the truth, 
we must engage real people in real discourses, for otherwise we would not 
take into account and empathise with the situations, judgements and inter-
ests of everyone concerned.16 But as Samuel Freeman notes, this discords 
with the aim to discover what would be agreed to among fully rational, moral, 
and informed persons in ideal speech situations: “Empathy with existing 
citizens’ current situations and interests would not seem to be necessary for 
these purposes. It could even be distracting” (Freeman 2000: 386). And if 
there is any correlation between a person’s being affected and his or her 
capability to reach balanced, rational and impartial judgements, then that 
correlation is negative. 
                                                   
16 Habermas incorporates this regard for the affected in his central “discourse principle” 
which states that “just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational discourses” (Habermas 1996: 107). 
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There are a few more reasons why it seems strange or contradictory for 
deliberative democratic theory to rely on the all-affected principle to delimit 
the relevant political community. On the one hand, deliberation is supposed 
to occur between all those who are, or who consider themselves to be, 
affected by a political decision. On both the objective and the subjective 
approach to affectedness, being affected has something to do with having bad 
things happening to you. You perceive your interests to be threatened and so 
you take political action to secure your interests but not necessarily to seek 
solutions that promote the common good. On the other hand, deliberation is 
a noble sport, where actors are not supposed to resort to such base, myopic 
or egoistic motivations as self-interest. Nor are they, in Habermasian terms, 
supposed to take strategic action which preys on the free and equal exchange 
of beliefs and intentions. 
Proponents of deliberative democracy assume that people engaging in 
deliberation can be moved by motives such as concern for reciprocity, a 
sense of justice, a willingness to cooperate with others on fair terms or a 
commitment to public reason-giving (Freeman 2000: 380 f.). Otherwise, the 
ideal of a deliberative democracy would not be feasible. Such assumptions 
are also implied in the epistemic argument for deliberative democracy. Fur-
thermore, radical deliberative democrats usually criticise aggregative models 
of democracy, claiming that these models simply treat people’s interests as a 
pre-political given. Deliberative democracy, by contrast, they insist, has a 
potential to transform the participants’ interests and identities (Dryzek 2000; 
King 2003). 
Thus, using the all-affected principle as the criterion for whom to in-
clude in deliberative processes appears to be contradictory. People should get 
involved in politics because they are affected, but once they enter into delib-
eration, they must leave their affects, so to speak, out of the debate. Alterna-
tively, the preferences which lead people to take political action should 
transmogrify into something different, higher-minded and less self-serving. 
But if the motivations for becoming involved in the first place are so suspect 
and so detrimental that they have to be kept out of the deliberative process, 
why should they then, at the same time, constitute the criterion of legitimate 
inclusion? If nothing else, the all-affected principle appears to saddle real 
people engaging in deliberation with unrealistic requirements. 
In sum, we run into some peculiar tensions within deliberative demo-
cratic theory if we support it based on the all-affected principle as the crite-
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rion to delineate the relevant political community. However, just as was the 
case for cosmopolitan democrats, there would not be much normative thrust 
in deliberative democrats’ quest for transnational democracy if they were 
simply to discard the principle. Alternatively, deliberative democrats could 
stick with the tradition that regards being subjectively affected as an ena-
bling condition of politics, but then they would have to tone down their 
epistemic claims. Additionally, adopting a subjective notion of affectedness 
renders their theory only slightly less different from the interest-aggregative 
models of democracy from which they prefer to distance themselves. 
4. Rescuing Transnational Democracy 
The all-affected principle, I have argued, is not a useful tool for drawing any 
political boundaries. So without the principle which has spurred recent 
claims for taking democracy to the transnational level, would the quests for 
transnational democracy be vapid as well? Not necessarily. Some philoso-
phers of science suggest that there are anomalies to all theories, so we 
should not consider a theory refuted until we have something better to 
substitute for it. The same might be true for normative theories: A flawed and 
apparently contradictory principle may be better than no principle at all. If 
we do reject the all-affected principle, could we perhaps find a substitute that 
would rescue quests for transnational democracy? Let me conclude this 
paper by considering just such a replacement for the all-affected principle, 
and let us see whether the proposed replacement would actually advance 
transnational democratic theory. 
A different way to express the congruence implied in the all-affected 
principle, between governing and being governed, between making decisions 
and being impacted by them, would be to declare that everyone who is sub-
ject to the laws should be allowed to participate in making them (cf. Beck-
man 2004).17 Because it is closer to the classic notion of democratic auton-
omy and reciprocity, this subject-to-the-law principle would solve some, 
although not all, of the problems that follow from the all-affected principle. 
How does being subject to the law differ from being affected by collective 
decisions? The two principles do not necessarily overlap: You may be subject 
to laws that do not affect your interests in any sense, and vice versa. Unlike 
                                                   
17 With some qualifications, of course, such as excluding transients from the right to partici-
pate and specifying what a reasonable level of participation requires. 
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the consequences implied in the all-affected principle, however, being subject 
to the law cannot always be expressed as a calculus of costs and benefits. 
Furthermore, laws normally specify to whom they apply—usually people 
living within a territorial state. So the subject-to-the-law principle offers no 
real solution to the boundary problem, since it merely presumes that the 
relevant community is already determined and that there is already a state in 
place to maintain the laws and do the subjecting. 
The point is, however, that the subject-to-the-law principle sets clearer 
(if not self-evident) criteria for illegitimate inclusion/exclusion than the all-
affected principle does. We can easily think of cases when people are sub-
jected to laws that they have not participated in making (even if merely 
indirectly or passively), or cases when people participate in making laws to 
which they are not subjected themselves. Moreover, given that it is easier to 
determine who is and who is not subject to a law than, say, who is affected 
by a particular decision,18 illegitimate inclusion and exclusion seem to be 
more readily identifiable by the subject-to-the-law principle than by the all-
affected principle.19 Put differently, the subject-to-the-law principle is more 
specific as to what should be democratically controlled: namely, the power to 
legislate but not necessarily the power to make any decision or take any 
action, individually or collectively, which may affect someone else. Further-
more, we need not fear the consequences that Agné spells out from the all-
affected principle, because a law (ideally at least) applies to all its subjects 
regardless of their individual properties. 
Since there are already supranational law-making institutions in place, 
the subject-to-the-law principle could substantiate claims to democratise 
                                                   
18 Someone might object that the subject-to-the-law principle is only an explication of the all-
affected principle which relies on a special theory of affectedness purporting that individu-
als have an interest of some sort not to be subjected to laws that they have not made them-
selves, and that such a theory is just as disputable as other theories of interests. On the 
other hand, the basic assumption underlying the subject-to-the-law principle could be 
hinged on many different ideals; but I think no normative democratic theory could do with-
out a baseline assumption about a human propensity for autonomy—about human beings 
being capable of creating laws for themselves. 
19 Susan Marks blurs the distinction between these two principles when she ponders about 
how the all-affected principle may solve problems of jurisdiction over foreign businesses: 
[Congruence between decision-making and its outcomes] is lacking when those in one country are 
made subject to the jurisdiction of another. But, from the perspective of the latter, congruence is 
also lacking when those in one undertake activities which constrain the options available to 
another country, yet escape its control (Marks 2000: 114). 
 Marks actually alludes to two different kinds of illegitimate exclusion: Her first sentence 
concerns the subject-to-the-law principle, whereas the second one concerns the all-affected 
principle. This shows why the two principles do not overlap and why they may even con-
flict. 
Johan Karlsson: Affected and Subjected—The All-Affected Principle in Transnational Democratic Theory 25
 
 
them. This would be no modest claim, given the tendency toward increasing 
legalisation by transnational institutions (Zürn 2005). Consider, for example, 
the European Union: Although it allegedly offers European residents only 
poor possibilities to participate in all-European affairs, the EU creates many 
laws which override national legislation. Of course, the subject-to-the-law 
principle also lacks a preference for levels. Instead of suggesting suprana-
tional democratisation, we could conclude that the power to legislate should 
be brought back to national legislatures. On this point, the two principles are 
equally undetermined and would have to be complemented by some ideas 
about why renationalisation is either unfeasible or undesirable, or both. 
Thus, while the subject-to-the-law principle could in fact lend some 
support to a quest for transnational democratisation, it would not allow the 
sweeping statements made by some cosmopolitan democrats and some 
deliberative democrats inspired by the all-affected principle. Although this 
principle would perhaps not allow them to condemn France for violating the 
democratic rights of others, by nuking Pacific atolls, it could, I think, allow 
them to suggest that institutions like the European Union and other interna-
tional legislative bodies should be democratically accountable. 
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